[nycbug-talk] [ccc related] MD5 considered harmful today
bonsaime at gmail.com
Wed Dec 31 01:01:38 EST 2008
On Tue, Dec 30, 2008 at 9:19 PM, Miles Nordin <carton at ivy.net> wrote:
> >>>>> "cs" == Charles Sprickman <spork at bway.net> writes:
> cs> https://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/
> ``Until Firefox 3 and IE 7, certificate revocation was disabled by
> default. Even in the latest versions, the browsers rely on the
> certificate to include a URL pointing to a revocation server.''
man that sucks... so even if this issue in the paper is addressed, it won't
matter until the browsers fix the revocation mechanism.
> pwaaaahahaha! rapidssl ist gePWNen!
> talk mailing list
> talk at lists.nycbug.org
I'll have to throw in the part that really wowed me... frankly I can barely
wrap my head around the POTS creation of signed certs, but maybe I'm dumb.
Too many damn tiers... should rather be based on many peers, but I'll write
the paper up later on this though : )
"It turned out to be possible to hide [MD5] collision blocks inside
moduli while even assuring the security of the pairs of moduli as being both
products of sufficiently large primes. "
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