[nycbug-talk] RSA/DSA for encryption: has it's time come?

idMac idmac at free.fr
Thu Aug 29 03:05:13 EDT 2013


Thank you, I'll search where I read it !


> On 28 août 2013, at 14:38, Okan Demirmen <okan at demirmen.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 7:57 AM, idMac <idmac at free.fr> wrote:
>> Hi All,
>> 
>> I know it's not enough but it could be 'one more edge' to improve secured
>> access, it's the yubikey.
>> Or just a usb stick transformed to be used with pamusb lib.
> 
> Yes, I totally agree, especially with yubikey.
> 
>> Another thing, ECDSA is better than RSA until size is lower than 1024 or
>> 2048 bits I read. (But I would have confirmation/infirmation of it)
>> For example, RSA key with more than 4096 could be stronger than ECDSA key
>> with 4096 bits.
>> 
>> Is it true ?
> 
> I won't post potentially mis-information, and leave it to someone
> else...archives are a killer :)
> 
>> Thank you,
>> Julien
>> 
>> On 28 Aug, 2013, at 4:07 AM, George Rosamond <george at ceetonetechnology.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Okan Demirmen:
>> 
>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 9:50 PM, George Rosamond
>> <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Okan Demirmen:
>> 
>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 7:24 PM, George Rosamond
>> <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Okan Demirmen:
>> 
>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 9:58 AM, Isaac (.ike) Levy
>> <ike at blackskyresearch.net> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Hi All,
>> 
>> I'd love to know what people's thoughts are on the state of older
>> RSA/DSA encryption, versus the future of eliptic curve ECDSA:
>> 
>> http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517781/math-advances-raise-the-prospect-of-an-internet-security-crisis/
>> 
>> --
>> A few years ago, a number of us were wary of the brand-spankin'-new ECC
>> crypto for use in SSH public keys.  And then months later, there were
>> some ECDSA/ssh implementation problems exposed:
>> 
>> http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=130613765816780&w=2
>> 
>> So, that was 2 years ago, ECDSA implementations are now no longer in
>> their infancy.
>> 
>> --
>> What are people's thoughts on the practicality of starting to use ECDSA
>> keys?
>> 
>> Has anyone here seen their use mandated over RSA/DSA in a business setting?
>> Has anyone just jumped into ECDSA bliss, and not looked back?
>> 
>> 
>> Not that this might mean much, but I use them.
>> 
>> As for policies in a business setting; I gather such technical
>> policies are made by people like you, so it's likely up to what folks
>> like you write in said policies :)
>> 
>> 
>> So I'm in the process of getting a client to pickup better practices
>> with SSH, and found out even OSX 10.7.5 doesn't support ecdsa.
>> 
>> AFAIK, Putty doesn't either yet, and I doubt SSH for Windows does either.
>> 
>> 
>> So many things there just blew my mind...but OK, I'll mend myself later :)
>> 
>> I'd simply recommend to them to start using keys, regardless of type -
>> get them in the habit, and whenever these other tools get support for
>> the new fangle stuff, just add to authorized keys and migrate.  Just
>> get them in the habit of thinking about keys instead.  I'm sure you
>> know all this....
>> 
>> 
>> Like most of the sane world, they are using keys.. with passwds.  I'm
>> going the next step.
>> 
>> 
>> I figured.  So here's my issue, and you can call it a double-edged
>> sword if you want - one is storing private keys on client that lives
>> in an extremely hostile environment - that is the vector that needs to
>> be addressed.  Sure, remove keys and use passwords instead - then
>> we're back to that debate.
>> 
>> Double-edged? Maybe, but think about the use-case and attack vectors -
>> that's all I'm saying.
>> 
>> 
>> So this would be much easier if we could have IRC synchronized with
>> talk@  ;)  (efnet #nycbug)
>> 
>> Security and its related fields are often relative, and dependent upon
>> adversaries in question.  And part of the relative and cumulative issue
>> is with user behavior.
>> 
>> Don't require a strict security policy on passwds and 12 other things
>> overnight.  Once they figure out how to create and remember multiple
>> long passwds, then you build off that, for instance.  So you have them
>> comfortably using SSH, then keys.  And keys with passwds doesn't seem so
>> initimidating.
>> 
>> g
>> 
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