<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Nov 7, 2017 at 4:36 AM, Sujit K M <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:kmsujit@gmail.com" target="_blank">kmsujit@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Nov 7, 2017 1:41 AM, "Jim B." <<a href="mailto:jpb@jimby.name" target="_blank">jpb@jimby.name</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail-m_-3279504581930133703quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">* Thomas Levine <_@<a href="http://thomaslevine.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">thomaslevine.com</a>> [2017-11-06 11:22]:<br>
<div class="gmail-m_-3279504581930133703quoted-text">> I am very satisfied with my password management approach, and<br>
> I keep debating whether it is safe to share. On one hand,<br>
> I theoretically think that sharing it would not provide an adversary<br>
> with enough information to guess my passwords or otherwise bother me,<br>
> but I also wonder whether it would tell the adversary enough to study<br>
> the relevant approaches/software enough to come up with a vulnerability.<br>
> Does anyone have any commentary on my concern?<br>
><br>
<br>
</div>Like many valuable things, it depends on your risk model.<br>
Who is your adversary? A 3LA? Large well funded criminal<br>
enterprise? A really good hacker? Random scripty?<br>
<br>
For most folks, I suspect it is the latter. On the other hand,<br>
it doesn't matter who it is - personally I want to keep my shit<br>
safe from *all* prying eyes. It may not be great shit but it's<br>
*my* shit, and I want to keep it that way.<br>
<br>
You could of course, follow the web of trust model - share<br>
individually with those you trust and gain feedback to improve<br>
your defenses.<br>
<br>
That said, I'll share my approach. Just don't hack me and steal<br>
all my shit :-) I'm going to number all the elements below<br>
to allow for easy commentary. I welcome all comments and<br>
suggestions on how to improve this setup.<br>
<br>
<br>
1. My "password vault" is just a text file on my TrueOS laptop.<br>
<br>
2. The file (in some directory) is encrypted with gpg2(1) with a<br>
strong password. I do not keep a clear text version on hard<br>
disk.<br>
<br>
3. To edit the file, I create a memory disk, format it with newfs(8)<br>
mount it, and lock down the mountpoint.<br>
<br>
4. I copy the encrypted file to the memory disk, decrypt, edit,<br>
save, and re-encrypt it all on the memory disk. Lastly, I<br>
use "rm -P" to "securely delete" the decrypted copy that<br>
I edited.<br>
<br>
5. The encrypted file is copied back to my hard disk.<br>
<br>
6. The memory disk is unmounted and deleted.<br>
<br>
7. The ASCII-armored file is then steganographically embedded<br>
inside a JPEG file. I use outguess(1) (by Niels Provos)<br>
for the steganography operations. This operation has a<br>
completely different password.<br>
<br>
8. The .JPG file is copied to a secure location online.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thus, I have a local ASCII armored encrypted file on my disk,<br>
and I have a copy of that file embedded inside a JPEG file<br>
on my disk, and also somewhere online.<br>
<br>
<br>
9. If I just want to view the file, I open up a new terminal,<br>
cat the encrypted file and pipe it to "gpg2 -d" which<br>
outputs the clear text to the terminal window. I<br>
copy/paste whatever I need, and delete the terminal window<br>
when done. pinentry(1) is used for passing the password<br>
to gpg2 in this step.<br>
<br>
<br>
That's it.<br>
<br>
Comments welcome!<br>
<font color="#888888">Jim B.<br>
</font><div class="gmail-m_-3279504581930133703elided-text"><br>
<br>
<br>
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</div></blockquote></div>Do open source developer's really need security. Not a joke. Look you have source's of all projects.</div></div></div>
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