[nycbug-talk] RSA/DSA for encryption: has it's time come?

[Okan Demirmen]

On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 7:57 AM, idMac <idmac at free.fr> wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> I know it's not enough but it could be 'one more edge' to improve secured
> access, it's the yubikey.
> Or just a usb stick transformed to be used with pamusb lib.

Yes, I totally agree, especially with yubikey.

> Another thing, ECDSA is better than RSA until size is lower than 1024 or
> 2048 bits I read. (But I would have confirmation/infirmation of it)
> For example, RSA key with more than 4096 could be stronger than ECDSA key
> with 4096 bits.
>
> Is it true ?

I won't post potentially mis-information, and leave it to someone
else...archives are a killer :)

> Thank you,
> Julien
>
> On 28 Aug, 2013, at 4:07 AM, George Rosamond <george at ceetonetechnology.com>
> wrote:
>
> Okan Demirmen:
>
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 9:50 PM, George Rosamond
> <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:
>
> Okan Demirmen:
>
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 7:24 PM, George Rosamond
> <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:
>
> Okan Demirmen:
>
> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 9:58 AM, Isaac (.ike) Levy
> <ike at blackskyresearch.net> wrote:
>
>
> Hi All,
>
> I'd love to know what people's thoughts are on the state of older
> RSA/DSA encryption, versus the future of eliptic curve ECDSA:
>
> http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517781/math-advances-raise-the-prospect-of-an-internet-security-crisis/
>
> --
> A few years ago, a number of us were wary of the brand-spankin'-new ECC
> crypto for use in SSH public keys.  And then months later, there were
> some ECDSA/ssh implementation problems exposed:
>
> http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=130613765816780&w=2
>
> So, that was 2 years ago, ECDSA implementations are now no longer in
> their infancy.
>
> --
> What are people's thoughts on the practicality of starting to use ECDSA
> keys?
>
> Has anyone here seen their use mandated over RSA/DSA in a business setting?
> Has anyone just jumped into ECDSA bliss, and not looked back?
>
>
> Not that this might mean much, but I use them.
>
> As for policies in a business setting; I gather such technical
> policies are made by people like you, so it's likely up to what folks
> like you write in said policies :)
>
>
> So I'm in the process of getting a client to pickup better practices
> with SSH, and found out even OSX 10.7.5 doesn't support ecdsa.
>
> AFAIK, Putty doesn't either yet, and I doubt SSH for Windows does either.
>
>
> So many things there just blew my mind...but OK, I'll mend myself later :)
>
> I'd simply recommend to them to start using keys, regardless of type -
> get them in the habit, and whenever these other tools get support for
> the new fangle stuff, just add to authorized keys and migrate.  Just
> get them in the habit of thinking about keys instead.  I'm sure you
> know all this....
>
>
> Like most of the sane world, they are using keys.. with passwds.  I'm
> going the next step.
>
>
> I figured.  So here's my issue, and you can call it a double-edged
> sword if you want - one is storing private keys on client that lives
> in an extremely hostile environment - that is the vector that needs to
> be addressed.  Sure, remove keys and use passwords instead - then
> we're back to that debate.
>
> Double-edged? Maybe, but think about the use-case and attack vectors -
> that's all I'm saying.
>
>
> So this would be much easier if we could have IRC synchronized with
> talk@  ;)  (efnet #nycbug)
>
> Security and its related fields are often relative, and dependent upon
> adversaries in question.  And part of the relative and cumulative issue
> is with user behavior.
>
> Don't require a strict security policy on passwds and 12 other things
> overnight.  Once they figure out how to create and remember multiple
> long passwds, then you build off that, for instance.  So you have them
> comfortably using SSH, then keys.  And keys with passwds doesn't seem so
> initimidating.
>
> g
>
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