[nycbug-talk] RSA/DSA for encryption: has it's time come?

[idMac]

Hi All,

I know it's not enough but it could be 'one more edge' to improve secured access, it's the yubikey.
Or just a usb stick transformed to be used with pamusb lib.

Another thing, ECDSA is better than RSA until size is lower than 1024 or 2048 bits I read. (But I would have confirmation/infirmation of it)
For example, RSA key with more than 4096 could be stronger than ECDSA key with 4096 bits.

Is it true ?

Thank you,
Julien

On 28 Aug, 2013, at 4:07 AM, George Rosamond <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:

> Okan Demirmen:
>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 9:50 PM, George Rosamond
>> <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:
>>> Okan Demirmen:
>>>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 7:24 PM, George Rosamond
>>>> <george at ceetonetechnology.com> wrote:
>>>>> Okan Demirmen:
>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 9:58 AM, Isaac (.ike) Levy
>>>>>> <ike at blackskyresearch.net> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hi All,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I'd love to know what people's thoughts are on the state of older
>>>>>>> RSA/DSA encryption, versus the future of eliptic curve ECDSA:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517781/math-advances-raise-the-prospect-of-an-internet-security-crisis/
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> A few years ago, a number of us were wary of the brand-spankin'-new ECC
>>>>>>> crypto for use in SSH public keys.  And then months later, there were
>>>>>>> some ECDSA/ssh implementation problems exposed:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=130613765816780&w=2
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> So, that was 2 years ago, ECDSA implementations are now no longer in
>>>>>>> their infancy.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> What are people's thoughts on the practicality of starting to use ECDSA
>>>>>>> keys?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Has anyone here seen their use mandated over RSA/DSA in a business setting?
>>>>>>> Has anyone just jumped into ECDSA bliss, and not looked back?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Not that this might mean much, but I use them.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> As for policies in a business setting; I gather such technical
>>>>>> policies are made by people like you, so it's likely up to what folks
>>>>>> like you write in said policies :)
>>>>> 
>>>>> So I'm in the process of getting a client to pickup better practices
>>>>> with SSH, and found out even OSX 10.7.5 doesn't support ecdsa.
>>>>> 
>>>>> AFAIK, Putty doesn't either yet, and I doubt SSH for Windows does either.
>>>> 
>>>> So many things there just blew my mind...but OK, I'll mend myself later :)
>>>> 
>>>> I'd simply recommend to them to start using keys, regardless of type -
>>>> get them in the habit, and whenever these other tools get support for
>>>> the new fangle stuff, just add to authorized keys and migrate.  Just
>>>> get them in the habit of thinking about keys instead.  I'm sure you
>>>> know all this....
>>> 
>>> Like most of the sane world, they are using keys.. with passwds.  I'm
>>> going the next step.
>> 
>> I figured.  So here's my issue, and you can call it a double-edged
>> sword if you want - one is storing private keys on client that lives
>> in an extremely hostile environment - that is the vector that needs to
>> be addressed.  Sure, remove keys and use passwords instead - then
>> we're back to that debate.
>> 
>> Double-edged? Maybe, but think about the use-case and attack vectors -
>> that's all I'm saying.
> 
> So this would be much easier if we could have IRC synchronized with
> talk@  ;)  (efnet #nycbug)
> 
> Security and its related fields are often relative, and dependent upon
> adversaries in question.  And part of the relative and cumulative issue
> is with user behavior.
> 
> Don't require a strict security policy on passwds and 12 other things
> overnight.  Once they figure out how to create and remember multiple
> long passwds, then you build off that, for instance.  So you have them
> comfortably using SSH, then keys.  And keys with passwds doesn't seem so
> initimidating.
> 
> g
> 
> _______________________________________________
> talk mailing list
> talk at lists.nycbug.org
> http://lists.nycbug.org/mailman/listinfo/talk

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.nycbug.org:8443/pipermail/talk/attachments/20130828/41df89f2/attachment.htm>